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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: Maritime Casualties and the Lessons to be Learned: Their
application and use in the Maritime Teaching and Training
process.
Degree:

MS‘:

The dissertation is a study of maritime casualties drawing on investigations and
critically analysing the failures due to human factors, equipment or a combination of
both that has culminated in causing these casualties. The ultimate aim of this work is
to help in the education and training of seafarers in accordance with the STCW95
convention so as to prevent the occurrence of casualties.

The roles of the master, officers and ratings were examined with emphasis on their
contribution to the casualties.

The growth and development of ships’ instrumentation, technological improvements
and the ergonomics of the ships’ layout were investigated to evaluate their effects on
human performance and possible contribution to casualties.
Some major casualties were investigated to draw out lessons to be learned in view of
their benchmark effect in the introduction of major IMO conventions and other
international and national rules and regulations.

Casualties were evaluated to highlight the things that went wrong, problems faced and
to identify major causal effects.
The impact of human factors, human elements and human error in relation to
casualties, including the effect of fatigue, stress, age and experience, was emphasised
in the context of the infallibility of the man-machine interface.
Major causal effects such as Fire, Collision, Stranding, and Explosion, were identified
and deﬁned.

The concluding chapter examines the result of the investigations and discusses the
proposals. A number of recommendations are made for a more effective and efficient
personnel and ship to prevent future occurrence of casualties.

KEYWORDS: ._Analysis,
Investigation, Training.

Assessment, Education, Evaluation, Examination,
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to highlight the causal effects of maritime casualties
so as to draw lessons that lead eventually to preventing ﬁxture occurrence. It is also

to apply lessons learned in the pedagogical environment especially in simulator

training where a lot of casualty scenario can be reviewed within the safe conﬁnes of
the classroom.

In addition, it is intended to synthesise the investigation of casualties in order to
develop skill in navigation and collision avoidance technique, passage planning and to

keep safe and good teamwork on the ship.

The yearly number and cost of casualties in the maritime industry for the past ten

years have been steadily reducing though at a slow rate compared to the number of
conventions and amount of legislation passed. Investigation was directed at ﬁnding
the reasons for these casualties highlighting factors like machine, weather, ship

environment and ergonomic parameters. The various kinds of casualties ﬁ'om ﬁre,
collision, stranding, explosion were examined as major causal effects. The effects of

human error on casualties including age, experience, motivation, language, fatigue and
stress were noted.
Maritime casualty is a serious or fatal accident in the marine environment.

The

damage done to the environment and the economy of the industry is devastating not
to mention lives lost. Eighty percent of all accidents are postulated to have been as a

result of human error thus this work examines the interface between man, machine
and nature. The investigation examines human interaction with nature, whether man

is forcing nature to obey his rules or whether man should align his rules to conform
with nature.

Materials were drawn upon from publications from the classiﬁcation societies,
maritime administrations, the IMO and various periodicals. The selected material was
reviewed, evaluated and critically analysed so as to develop relevant argument.

The difﬁculties faced during the writing process were kept under control because
ﬁom the beginning in October 1997, the process was deﬁned and reﬁned several times
until a clearly identiﬁed statement emerged. The planning and management of the
work was careﬁrlly organised in accordance with the research plan. A critical path

analysis, for data collection and writing, was drawn up so that time was not wasted on
unnecessary items no matter how interesting they might be. A clear and detailed

record of references was kept.
This work has been divided into six chapters.

The ﬁrst chapter covers the

introduction which outlines the purpose of the study and methodology used.
The second chapter explores maritime casualties with emphasis on the incidents that
have caused them. The causal effects are analysed.

Chapter three looks at maritime casualty investigation, examining the methods of

investigation that will bring out all the relevant parameters to encourage better
understanding of casualties thereby preventing them ﬁ'om reoccurring.
The fourth chapter focuses on the casualties that have had major media attention and

caused the introduction of new regulations, conventions and codes over the years.
Chapter ﬁve expands on the effect of human factor in maritime casualties.

It

highlights the obstacle to safety at sea, education and training of crew as a source of
curtailing casualties. The inﬂuence of age, experience, stress, fatigue, management
ethics or its non existence and navigation aids as causes of casualties is highlighted.

The deﬁnition of casualty extends to include Constructive Total Loss and as stated by
Hooke (1997, ix):

A right of a marine assured to claim a total loss on the policy

because either (1) the property has been lost and recovery is

unlikely, or (2) an actual loss appears to be unavoidable, or

(3) to prevent an actual total loss it would be necessary to

incur an expenditure which would exceed the saved value of
the property or, in the case of a hull policy, the ‘insured’ value

expressed in the policy. To establish a claim for constructive

total loss the assured must abandon what remains of the
property to underwriters and give his intention to do so.

The coverage of the investigation extends beyond the actual loss situation and
includes casualties that have been declared a constructive total loss.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 CLASSIFICATION OF CASUALTIES

Man'ne casualty means a fatal accident, according to IMO document FSI5/ 10/1, that
has resulted in ;

O the death of, or serious injury to, a person that is caused

by, or in connection with, the operations of a ship; or
O

the loss of a person from a ship that is caused by or in

connection with, the operations of a ship, or
O

the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship; or

O

sen'ous material damage to a ship; or

O

the stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a
ship in a collision; or

O

serious material damage being caused by, or in connection

with the operations of a ship; or
O

serious damage to the environment (brought about by the
damage of a ship or ships) being caused by, or in

connection with, the operations of a ship or ships.
Marine casualties, according to the HMO definition, are classed under two main
categon'es- serious and very serious.

Very serious casualty means a fatal accident which involves the total loss of a ship,

loss of life or severe pollution. The other category deﬁnes a situation other than that
above but involves fire, explosion, grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice
damage, hull cracking or hull defect. These subsequently result in structural damage

making the ship unseaworthy. This could lead to the ship's hull underwater being

holed immobilisation of the main propulsion system, extensive accommodation

damage or pollution to the environment (irrespective of quantity) and possibly a

breakdown necessitating towage or shore assistance.

2.2 ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES

A project to investigate the Norwegian registered ships in the 1970s, by the

classiﬁcation society Det Norske Veritas in co-operation with Norwegian Maritime
Authorities, shows that external conditions were found to be the largest causal effects
for ships over 100 grt, with channel and shallow water effects accounting for

approximately 19 per cent of grounding of ships over 1599 grt.

Reduced visual

conditions were the main factor for 12.6 per cent of cases for bigger ships. There are
twice as many groundings in dark conditions as in daylight.

It was found that for ships of less than 1600 grt, the main cause for 19.1 per cent of

groundings was due to inadequate coverage of the watch, mostly through having an
unmanned bridge. Another 4 per cent due to crew asleep on watch.

Collisions and Groundings top the Table 2.1 and ﬁgure 2.1 of causes of casualties
with Groundings at 45.68 per cent and collisions at 30.51 per cent. The occurrence

of reported cases of casualties of ships below 100 grt is low compared to that of ships
above 1499 grt because of inadequate reporting.

The lower percentage casualty

frequency for ships of over 1499 grt is attributed to the fact that such ships spend less
time in the more difﬁcult coastal waters.

The major causal effects of casualties can be categorised under six broad areas as
shown on Table 2.2 and ﬁgure 2.2 as explained below.

External condr'tions- these are conditions that mitigate against eﬂicient navigational
aids; fault and deﬁciency from lights, marks etc.; reduced visual conditions and
external inﬂuences due to channel and shallow water effects.

Technical failure/ergonomic»

these are faults due to the ship’s technical system;

serviceability of navigational aids; remote control of steering and main propulsion
units; and failure or deﬁciency in communication equipment.

Inadequate navigational factors- these are due to bridge design and arrangement;
error in chart or nautical publications; bridge manning and organisation; poor
communication on the bridge; and inadequate knowledge and experience.

Table 2.1: Type, number and percentage distribution of casualties under Nonavegian
ﬂag from 1970-1973.

Collisions and Groundings

2742

Fire and Explosions

420

76.19%
11.67%

Capsizing

74

2.06%
3.47%

Leakage

125

Machinery damage

121

3.36%

Miscellaneous

117

3.25%

FIG.2.1-CasualtyFrequency
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Navigational errors- these are due to navigational and manoeuvring factors;
misinterpretation or incomplete utilisation of information from ﬁxed objects like light

and marks; ship’s operating equipment; and wrong interpretation of trafﬁc
infonnation.

Non-compIr'ance- these are due to inadequate watch keeping and other human
factors.

Other Ship- these are due primarily to the fault of other ship and navigational error
on the other ship.

Table 2.2 below shows the causal effects under six broad areas.

External Conditions

28.4

Technical Failures

6.8

Inadequate Navigation Factors

8.6

Navigational Error

25.2

Non-compliance

19.5

Other Ship

11.5

Fig. 2.2 Causal Effects
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2.3 FIRE
This is one of the most dreaded fonns of casualty that is experienced on the ship. The

reason being there is nowhere to escape to and one of the best fonns of stopping it,
that is by water, if not controlled could affect the stability of the ship. Fire is a

component of three basic elements that have to be present to complete the equation
for it to manifest. These are: Fuel- which is the combustible material; Oxygen- that is

twenty (20) percent of Air, to conﬁrm the ﬁre cannot occur in vacuum; and Heat- this

causes the spontaneous combustion, helping the molecules of the fuel and that of
oxygen to combine spontaneously to form ﬁre. The extra danger of ﬁre is the fumes
fonned and depletion of oxygen that makes it deadly to human.

The engine room explosion on the motor tanker Haralabos is an example of a
casualty caused by ﬁre on the ship. She was a 99308 dwt tanker built in 1966 which

was declared a constructive total loss on 1 December 1982. An explosion in the

engine control room followed by a ﬁre on the 26 November 1982 after loading cargo
at Ras Gharib, Egypt caused the casualty.

The analysis of the fuel oil bunkered for use in the engine room of this ship showed it

had a low ﬂash point of 4 deg Celsius or less which is very low compared to the
recommended safe value of 60 deg Celsius. This low ﬂash point fuel oil released

sufﬁcient hydrocarbon gas to form a ﬂammable mixture with the air in the engine
room. Under this highly ﬂammable atmosphere, all that is needed to start a ﬁre or an

explosion is a spark or ﬂame from any source within the room, including a spark from
the electric switch board or somebody smoking. This is why there is a limit to the
ﬂash point of ﬁJBlcarried on ships. This recommendation is neither statutory nor

mandatory and so is dependent on the owner of the ship. It is suspected that this fuel

was tapped from the cargo tank through cross-connections between the bunker line,
stripping line and the tank-cleaning line.

For economic reasons certain operators are willing to take a dangerous risk by the use
of low-ﬂash-point oil.

2.4 COLLISION

This could be as a result of inadequate bridge organisation and the absence of a
methodical system of navigation for example plotting not being undertaken and in

some cases the ofﬁcer of the watch not having the training to construct a forecast plot
in possible collision situations. In cases of collision in reduced visibility, excessive

speed could be a factor. Collisions have occurred between a high speed ferry and a

poorly/unlit tow in congested waters.
Greenen (Seaways, Aug 1996, 13-14) has noted that:

A disturbing factor which is common place in all collisions which

occur at sea is that the persons involved were considerably above

average ability- indeed some of these professionals were persons of
high standing and held in esteem by their peers.

From this I

conclude that the present regulations are too complex in their nature
and open to conflicting interpretations.

In part, it is the complexity in the wording of the rules of the road and to a certain
extent conventions, codes and regulations that the maritime industry has had to live

with. These rules are worded in mostly legal languages that the average seafarer
cannot easily decipher under intense pressure at sea and are open to conﬂicting
interpretations. All regulations must be both practical and eﬁective.

The motor ship “Feddy” was a bulk carrier 1138lgt built in 1962, which was struck
on the port side by the Greek motor ship “Sounion" on the 10 February 1981 and

sank within thirty minutes. There were only three crewmen rescued after the ”Feddy"
capsized to port and sank so quickly by the bow.

The ﬁgure 2.3 below shows the geographical plot that describes how this collision

occurred.

Trade Wind

Feddv

Figure 2.3 Geographical plot of Feddy/Sounion collision, 10 February 1981.
There was a third ship involved in this casualty, the Greek motor ship Trade Wind.

The m/s Sounion was heading West for Gibraltar on a course of 265 degrees true,
whilst the m/s Trade Wind and Feddy were heading East. Trade Wind was on course

070 degrees true. Feddy was on course 077 degrees true. Sounion sighted the two
ships on radar at 0645 hours from a distance of about 17 miles (31.5 kilometres).

The Master of Souni0n.thought both ships were oﬁ‘ his starboard bow because of
poor visibility due to fog but he was wrong. At 0645 hours Feddy must have been

about 10 degrees off Sounion's port bow. At 0705 the Master of Sounion altered
course 13 degrees to port, to bring him to a new course of 245 degrees true. At 0720

the Master was advised that a fog signal was heard 25-30 degrees off her starboard
bow. The signal was from Trade Wind. It was at this moment that the Master of the

Sounion put his helm hard to port, placing her on a collision course with the Feddy.

The result was a serious violation of the rules of the Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972.

0 The Sounion was in violation of rule 7 (b). The Master of
Sounion failed to use his radar properly to obtain an

accurate early warning of the risk of collision, by radar
plotting.

O The Sounion was in violation of rule 7 (c). The Master of

Sounion

based

his

assumptions

on

scanty

radar

information. His interpretations were in error.
0 The Sounion was in violation of rule 14 (a) and 17 (c).

The master of Sounion altered course to port.
0 Both ships were in violation of rule 6. Both ships were

proceeding at an unsafe fast speed for this foggy condition.

This casualty highlights the importance of education ashore, training and experience at
sea to develop proﬁciency in radar plotting and interpretation. The human factor in
casualties forced the HVIOto amend the international convention on Standards of
Training, Certiﬁcation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 in 1995.

Some deck watch ofﬁcers will not use the technique of radar plotting to detennine the
course, speed and closest point of approach (CPA) of approaching ships, even when
faced with the risk of collision. Sometimes assumptions and actions are based on

scanty radar data. The use of an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) could eliminate
or reduce this problem.

2.5 GROUNDING

Human error accounts for most cases of grounding and a sizeable portion of these are
due to steering or propulsion machinery failure. This is signiﬁcant because in ninety

nine percent of the time if the steering gear and main propulsion system is ﬁinctional
the ship could easily be manoeuvred from danger. Even though the fault is placed on
the machinery it is known that remotely the failure originates from humans. So the

failure of the machinery in open ocean can be rectiﬁed without further danger to a
ship, but in close proximity to land the quick response of the engineer coupled with a
good anchor holding ground could save the ship.

Three causal factors behind the grounding of ships as a result of dragging anchor can
be identiﬁed:

6 Poor basic searnanship, anchoring ships close to shore and failing to monitor the

weather by forecast and observation, resulting in ships being caught on a lee shore.

0 General lack of understanding of the holding power of anchors and the
International Association of Classiﬁcation Societies requirements conceming
anchors particularly in the case of ship anchored off a fully exposed coast in rough

weather or to hold ship which is moving or drifting, and where the scope of the

ratio between the length of chain paid out and water depth is not understood.
0 A resistance by mariners to weigh anchor and put out to sea to ride out adverse
weather, although in some cases the ship may not have sufﬁcient fuel to put to sea.

Common causal factors relating to grounding while on passage mostly focus on poor
bridge resource management and the absence of any plan when manoeuvring in port

approaches or coastal waters. Also the lack of the understanding that anchors cannot
hold if the assumed current or wind speed is more than 2.5 metres per second (4.86
Knots).

A case study of the grounding of the steam turbine VLCC Olympic Bravery will be
considered. This vessel went aground on her maiden voyage to lay-up in Norway
from Brest, in France on 24 January of 1976. She had a modern steam turbine main

propulsion system with automatic controls with which the chief engineer was
unfamiliar, and that played a signiﬁcant part in the loss of propulsion and subsequent

grounding of the ship off Ushant, France. According to the Liberian board of Inquiry
Investigating Oﬂicer,

The chief engineer did not appear to have either the detailed
knowledge or the ability to explain clearly the relevant features and

functions of the boiler control system, although he had joined the
ship some four months previously in order to become familiar with

the propulsion system.

Nor was he able to give any detailed

account of what he did and what he thought during the critical
period of more than two hours.

The good point of having the shipbuilder's warranty engineer on the maiden voyage of
a ship was lost to the owners of this ship because his presence on the ship could have

prevented the failure due to unfamiliar personnel.

Part of the work of the

shipbuilder’s representative engineer on board is to help in the safe operation of the
ship’s machinery during this most crucial initial rumiing-in period.

The Olympic Bravery, a 270000 dwt cmde oil canier was powered by a Stal Laval
type AP 280/86 steam turbine unit supplying 24161 kW at 86 rev/rnin. Steam being

generated by two Foster Wheeler boilers ﬁtted with automatic feed and combustion
controls.

Electrical power was provided by two type- VMO 8D6fTV56K steam

turbines of Stal Laval design each driving through a reduction gearing a Jeumont

Schneider alternator of 440 V, 60 Hz, l450kW output, with an emergency supply
provided by a 450 kW diesel generator.

The main cause of the ship going aground was due to loss of power on the propulsion
system; the main boiler generating steam for the steam turbine could not ﬁmction long
enough to maintain the ship in manoeuvrable state. Secondly the ship was too close

to land in spite of the traflic separating zone. Also the master delayed the call for a

tug to rescue the ship, maybe because of inadequate infonnation from the engine
room as to the possibility of recovering from the blackout. The ship’s anchor could

not hold the drifting tanker. Maybe if both port and starboard anchors had been used

in tandem they could have checked the momentum of the ship towards the rocks.
This ship ended up being a total loss after she went on the rocks off Ushant and the
only safeguard against this sort of loss is dependable and well maintained machinery
manned by competent and alert engineers.

2.6 EXPLOSION

It was on 3 April 1980 off the coast of West Aﬁica that the motor tanker Mycene,
238889 dwt VLCC built in 1975, broke in two and sank following a series of
explosions and a ﬁre. M/'T Mycene was cleaning her cargo tanks on a ballast voyage

from Genoa, Italy to Ras Tanura when the ﬁrst explosion occurred. This ship had an

inert gas system, but on this day of tank-cleaning the system was not activated to

prevent an explosive mixture in the cargo tanks due to conﬁision on the part of the
master. And so an explosive mixture built up in the cargo tanks as recirculating

washing water from the slop tank, in a closed circuit system, was used to clean the
cargo tanks with ﬁxed high-capacity machines.

According to an investigation conducted on behalf of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs
of Liberia (1984):

The source of ignition was an incendiary spark released by an

electrostatic ..charge

which was

produced

by isolated

C

cylindrical lengths of water, or water slugs’, generated by
tank washing with recirculating water.

The cause of explosion in cargo tanks could be a tank not inerted and/or the use of
recirculating washing water in conjunction with ﬁxed high-capacity washing machines.

To avoid cargo tank explosion, rigid application of the safety precautions in the

ISGOTT documents is advised. The standards of training and experience need to be
improved and the master and cargo ofﬁcer should be highly motivated by a proper
sense of urgency to inert cargo tanks at all times.

The inert gas system is the main and absolute way of protection against an explosion
in a cargo tank.

2.7 STRUCTURAL FAILURE

The structural failure of the steam tanker Energy Concentration, 216269 dwt VLCC
built in 1970, occurred when she broke in two amidships while discharging at the

Mobil tenninal, Europort, Rotterdam, on 22 July 1980. She remained connected only

by the main deck plate but there was no ﬁre or explosion because her IGS was

operating properly. At the instant of the fracture, all cargo and ballast tanks across
the entire midsection, including tanks nos. 2, 3 and 4, were empty or nearly so.

(Table 2.3)

Bureau Veritas calculated the bending moment at frame 76, the point of the break, as
1809458 metre tons (Nrn) which was 1.7 times greater than the maximum permissible

bending moment of 1072098 Nm. The chief officer could not calculate the stress on
the ship’s hull by using the cargo-loading calculator on board because he did not have
the English translation of the manual. Yet he did not deem it ﬁt to inform the master,

which is rather unfortunate. Energy Concentration had a hog of 17 inches on 20 July
1980 upon departure from Antifer for Europort; draft forward was 46 ft 10 in; draft
amidships 49 ﬂ 06 in, and draﬁ aft was 55 ft 00 in. Unfortunately this did not alert

the master of the unacceptable hog of the ship. The ship operating booklet displays
sample trim and stability calculations under different load conditions and an

instruction for the longitudinal strength calculation and manual method of strength

computation were on board but never used.

The use of electronic loading calculators on VLCC and ULCC should be encouraged
and owners and operators to ensure that master and cargo officers are proﬁcient in
the use of loading calculators. The cargo discharge plan must be documented and
bending moment calculations must be made and recorded for actual and projected

phases of the discharge.

Table 2.3: Energ Concentration: cargo and ballast tank weights at time of casualty.
LOCATION

WEIGHT (tonnes x 1000)

No. 1 centre tank

30-7

No. 1 wing tanks (P & S)

27.1

No. 2 centre tank

0-0

No. 2 wing tanks

2-0

No.3 centre tank

0.0

No. 3 wing tanks (P & S)

0.0

No. 4 centre tank

0.0

No. 4 wing tanks (P & S)

2.0

No. 5 centre tank

29.3

No 5 wing tanks (P & S)

20.1

Slop tanks (P & S)

4.1

H

2.8 LOSTATSEA- DERBYSHIRE

The loss at sea of the OBO (oil/bulk/ore) Derbyshire laden with ore in a typhoon in
the western paciﬁc, in position approximately 25° 30’ North, 130° 30’ East, on about

9 September 1980 re-opened the enquiry into the large number of predominantly old
bulk carrier sinkings that have taken place since. This British ﬂag OBO was only four

years old, 294 metres in length and 169,000 dwt (91,654 gross tons) when she sank

with all forty-four members of her officers and ratings. She was typical of the type of

large combination canier that had been built in the previous decade.
She had a ﬂushed deck, with wide side rolling hatches giving the greatest possible

access for the grabs that would normally discharge the dry cargo. The access to the
fore part of the ship was provided by a ladder on top of the hatch covers, which
makes it difficult to walk during heavy head seas when she is deeply laden. Originally

bulk carriers were assumed to be very heavy and so could have little or no trouble

ﬁ'om heavy weather.

It was judged unnecessary to provide them with a raised

forecastle, which would have increased the freeboard by more than three metres and

provide some protection to the forward hatches.
These vessels were just bigger versions of the smaller, oil ships and the structural
designs were the same. These vessels were built in the age where economy and cargo

carrying capacity were required and of more priority by the shipowners, that is lighter

than their contemporaries. They were ships that were pennitted by the load lines rules
to load deeper than before, largely because of their size and supposed strength.

The information given here is an extrapolation of the ﬁndings of the assessors after

they had gone through over 135,000 photographs, several hundred hours of video

tape of the more than 2,000 pieces of wreckage on the sea bed (Grey, 1998, 26).
From this extrapolation it is assumed that the ship did not break up on the surface as

was previously believed, in way of a frame just forward of the bridge. This being the
assumption from ﬁndings on three of the existing sister ships built to the same design.
As she steamed with her bows into the swell generated by the gradually worsening

typhoon, water came over the bow on to a ﬂush decked forecastle with a small access

hatch into the bow store, protected only by a bulwark around the bow. In addition

around the foredeck were a number of ventilators for the spaces and tanks below.
There was no breakwater or, other than a couple windlasses, any other obstruction,
between the foredeck and the hatchcovers over no. 1 hold.

The Derbyshire broke up into pieces on the sea bottom about 600 kilometres off
Okinawa, with the largest section least damaged being that of the bow. The ship must

have been subjected to colossal explosions or implosions as the water pressure burst
open the tanks as the ship sank whilst the bow section had been ﬁlled up with water
prior to the sinking on the surface.

From photographs of the under water wreckage, the small access hatch was found
open and the forecastle ventilators had been torn off at some stage. It is suspected

that heavy seas coming over the bow damaged the access hatch and tore off the

ventilators, so that the bow section of the ship forward of no. 1 hold became ﬂooded.

This would have reduced the forward ﬁ'eeboard by up to 2.5 metres and make the
ship sluggish and less likely to rise to oncoming waves.

With this scenario where the forecastle space had been ﬂooded and the freeboard

reduced, heavy green water would have swept down the foredeck and smashed its
way into no. 1 hold, crushing the starboard hatchcover. The bow would have then

sunk further, and in quick succession, water would have poured into other holds.

Derbyshire must have then sank rapidly within a few minutes of the ﬁrst hold being
opened. No distress message was ever received.

The Derbyshire was a ﬂush decked ship with very little protection forward and a
greater reserve buoyancy would have been helpﬁil. The bow height and the overall

freeboard would have required to be increased to counter the high sea state
experienced in bad weather condition. It was recommended by the assessors also that

the fastenings and strength of cargo hatch covers should be looked into and the
positioning and design of ventilators, air pipes and access hatches on the fore and
main decks should be reconsidered to prevent seaway damage. Also the access to the

forecastle and fore end spaces should be made safe so that the crew could go forward
and inspect during heavy weather condition.

The Derbyshire was four years old when she sank and so the problem associated with
old bulk carriers of shell plating getting damaged following corrosion and detachment
from frames could be ruled less likely. The investigation of this ship at that depth of
water showed that it is possible to reach a signiﬁcant reason for the sinking.

The above conclusions were drawn after the investigators had the opportunity to
inspect the videos and photographs from the vessel at the bottom of the sea.
Following a number of bulk carrier disasters, especially after the loss of the

Derbyshire, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS)

introduced new mles for the construction of new ships and the structural alterations
to existing ships.

The introduction of the Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP) in 1993 had improved
the record of bulk carrier losses. Whilst IACS and IMO are continually working

together to get to the root cause of these maritime casualties, the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee decided to recommend the amendment of Assembly resolution
A.744(18) to bring it in line with IACS’ ESP. IACS still believe that the most

important element in avoiding structural loss is preserving the integrity of the hull and

hatch covers forming the primary watertight banier.

2.9 HUMAN ELEMENT IN CASUALTIES- IMO APPROACH.

The IMO is working on a Resolution on human element vision, principles and goals,

that is, taking the human element into consideration when drawing up regulations on

safety of shipping and prevention of marine pollution. The Resolution was draﬁed by

a meeting of the Marine Safety Committee(MSC) / Marine Environmental Protection
Committee (MEPC) Working Group on the human element which met in December
1996 and looked at issues such as the effects of fatigue on seafarers and how
accidents might be prevented by considering the human factor. There is an estimate

that up to 30 percent of maritime accidents may be caused by human error.

Some problems that might affect the work of a seafarer, and thereby contribute to
accidents, include alcohol abuse, inadequate technical knowledge or language skills,
fatigue, low morale and injury; but also staﬂing levels, work environment and
company management.

The US Coast Guard did a study that found that fatigue is a more signiﬁcant factor in

maritime accidents than previously expected.

According to the survey, it was

estimated that fatigue was a contributory factor in 33 percent of critical ship casualties

and 16 percent of personnel injury casualties, compared to ﬁgures of just 1.2 percent
and 1.3 percent found in a previous study.

This study also found that factors

contributing to fatigue included the number of consecutive days worked prior to the
incident, hours on duty prior to the incident and absence of company or union policy

on work hours. There is an IMO/ILO (lntemational Labour Organisation) working

group that will draft the fonnat of records to be kept of seafarers’ daily hours of work
and rest, in order to ensure compliance with established limits on working hours.

Language difference is another human element that has been found to cause human

error. The Committee considered the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases

(SMCP), drawn up by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation and agreed to use

the same procedure for introducing the SMCP as was used for introducing the
Standard Marine Navigational Vocabulary (SNVP), which was developed in the

1970s. Gennany has co-ordinated the development of SMCP which is designed to be
more comprehensive than the SNVP and “Seaspeak” currently in use. The SMCP is

made up of phrases that have been developed to cover the most important safety
related ﬁelds of verbal shore-to-ship (either way), ship-to-ship and on board
communications.

Who has the Con? This is a question that comes up when the master of a ship is on

the bridge with a watch oﬂicer and the conﬁision is who is in charge of the bridge at
this time. This has caused major casualties because the oﬂicer on watch assumed that

the anival of the master on the bridge meant that he is relieved of control (who has
the Con?) whilst the master believed he is only there to observe.

It is imperative

under this circumstance that the master should give a clearly understood instruction as

to the procedure to follow under this sort of situation to prevent disaster.
Alternatively the master on anival on the bridge should inform the watch ofﬁcer that
he is taking the “Con” and also when he wants the officer to take over. Of course this
does not relieve the officer on watch of all responsibility for safe navigation of the
ship by questioning any order of the master (be it diplomatically) that he sees to be
detrimental to the safety of the ship. The master of the ship will have to show his

greater leadership ability by encouraging oﬁicers to question his order anytime they
find it not to be safe for the ship or personnel.

An example of a casualty caused by navigation error and poor bridge procedure, is

shown by the grounding of the motor ship Sevillan Reefer just aﬁer midnight on the
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12 June 1978 on the Gordon Reef in the Titan Strait, off the Sinai Peninsula in the
Red Sea. She was a reefer ship of 4280 gt built in Bilbao, Spain in 1967.

The second ofﬁcer took over the 0000-0400 watch as the ship was already on course

025 degree true and was supposed to alter course to 360 degree true when she began
to transit the Enterprise Passage (See ﬁgure 2.4 next page). The second mate called

the Master to the bridge at 0050 when he saw the channel light to port, marking the

Enterprise passage, as directed by the master’s night order book. According to the
second mate,

Both the Gordon Reef light dead ahead and the Enterprise
Passage light ﬁne on the port bow were so clearly visible I felt

certain that the master had seen them for himself...... The

master and I stood in the wheelhouse watching the Gordon
Reef light get closer..... As to why he remained silent when

the master did not alter course to 360 degrees true, he said, I

had of course realised that very shortly after the 0059 position
had been reached the course of the ship should have been

altered to 360 degrees true .......However I expected the
master to give the order ......I did not think it was open to me
to give any helm or engine order or to say anything to the
master and I awaited his instructions (Chadwick, 1984, 8)

It is clear from above that the second mate had failed to take the necessary actions

demanded of him as the deck watch ofﬁcer when he knew the ship was heading

towards Gordon Reef. The master having just been on the bridge for ten minutes
before the grounding, had difficulty in visually detecting the Enterprise light and the

Gordon Reef light due to limited night vision. The lack of co-operation on the bridge
is evident and the ship was proceeding into this restricted water space at an
unnecessarily high sea speed.

It is imperative that in this case, a faithful adherence to an organised bridge procedure

such as those distributed by the IMO and team co-operation between the master and
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his deck watch officers is of importance to prevent this disaster. And masters should

be sensitive to the psychological make up of the watch ofﬁcers when they go on the
bridge so as not to intimidate the oﬁicer with their presence.

FIG.2.4 Geographical plot of MS Sevillan Reefer to point of stranding on the Reef

lﬂ
Sinai
Peninsula

Point of NC

CHAPTER 3

3. MARINE CASUALTYINVESTIGA TION

The objective of investigating any marine casualty is to learn from it, prevent such

casualty ﬁ'om occurring again and to help the designs of the ﬁiture.

Investigation

should identify the circumstances of the casualty under investigation and establish the
causes and the contributing factors, by gathering and analysing information and
drawing conclusions.

The investigating authority should not refrain from fully

reporting the causes because fault or liability may be inferred from the ﬁndings.

Flag States are recommended to conduct investigations into all casualties occuning to
its ships. As a minimum, all cases of serious and very serious nature should be

investigated and a casualty investigation report issued. These reports should contain

facts that are needed for a variety of reasons for safety, to meet the requirements of the
I.S.M. Code, for governmental inspectorates, and for legal and insurance purposes.
It is pertinent therefore that anytime we investigate an accident, be it a collision, ﬁre,

or any disaster for that matter, we do so with a high level of thoroughness and
attention to detail that can stand up to any question.

3.1 METHODOLOGY

The fundaments of any investigation is to make it as simple as possible but at the same

time not to lose focus on the objectives, and to allow experience to guide progress. It
is well known that accidents can occur ﬁom a simple occurrence often masked by

complex mistakes.

Patience, understanding and experience give the investigator a

better perspective and allow him to reﬁne his/her methodology to meet the ever
changing technologically advancing world. This world is marked by its dynamics in

technology: sail gave way to steam and then to diesel; rudders and propellers are
changing to water jets especially in small craft; and paper charts and sun sights are on
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the verge of being replaced by electronic charts and differential global positioning
systems.

The common factor in any investigation is the seafarer. Human error is responsible in

this high tech age for an alanningly high proportion of accidents and incidents whether
direct or indirect.

The methodology used by Thomas Cooper & Stibbard, London is as follows (1996,
30)

6 Establish the facts.

0 Recreate the Events.
0 Identify the Errors.
0 Obtain the Evidence.

0 Check that the story works.
This method is not complex or difﬁcult and if consistently applied to every incident

investigated, will provide a solid platfonn of evidence on which to negotiate, litigate,

legislate in govemment, educate in the case of an owner and eradicate or prevent the
incident reoccurring.

3.1.1 Establish the Facts:

0 Collision Position and Time (C)
Collision is all about space and only occurs if two (or more) ships arrive at the same

place at the same time. The collision position is an important criteria relevant to the
issues of blame. Whatever the collision time is, allocate the letter C to it so that all

times to the collision from the ships involved can be related to that time. This removes

the time differences contained in the evidence of both ships.

0 Course, Speed and Angle of Blow at Collision:
The approach of own ship before the collision needs to be recorded and in some cases

it is better to start with the collision and work backwards. The angle of blow evidence
is a very important piece of the investigation, helping to collaborate all other evidence.
A general indication of position and angle can be obtained by looking at the impact
area.
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It is common that the investigator will only have access to one of the ships involved in
the collision. And so it might be later before he knows about the scenario surrounding

the other ship. Take advantage of the access to the ﬁrst ship to know about the other
ship. The time, distance and bearing of the other ship when ﬁrst sighted are important

facts to be established. This is the starting point from where a better understanding of
the navigational countdown to collision is taken.

3.1.2 Recreate the Events:

0 Examine the Deck and Engine Logs:
The Log book of the ship should be noted because it gives a better and relatively
accurate information of the situation on the ship leading to the collision. This log book
information is mostly unbiased and tells a lot about the ship, the officers and the
navigation.

0 Interview Watch 0_[/icers and Crew:
These are the people who individually, or collectively, did not avoid the collision. In

most cases they all have'different but interlocking versions of the same events.
Statements should be taken from all those on watch at the time of the collision.

0 Plot information on a Chart:
A new, clean, up-to-date chart should always be taken on board by the investigator.
The working chart is evidence and must not be used again. A clean chart should be

used to plot out the navigation infonnation obtained ﬁ'om the navigation team.

3.1.3 Identify the Errors

6 Compare Deck and Engine Logs:
Access to both the deck and engine log books is of paramount importance in order to
help to conﬁmi or deny what is put into the deck log book after the collision. The

engineer on watch does not have the events outside the bridge window to conﬁxse his
recollection of time, or the sequence of events, in relation to the engine.
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0 Examine the Equipment Logs:
Reliance on any equipment should only be accepted when the variances and tolerances

which may affect the output of these are veriﬁed.

6 Compare deck and engine statements:
The log books on the bridge and in the engine room if synchronised should identify
errors.

3.1.4 Obtain the Evidence:

0 Secure the original Deck and Engine logs and the working Chart:
These are the basic pieces of evidence which are needed for any negotiation, or
litigation. In a collision the working chart is the most important. Secure it and remove

it from the ship. This applies to other recorded navigation information from the bridge
or engine room.

9 Ensure signed statements are obtained:
Those who give oral evidence must have it reduced to writing, be asked to read it,

correct it and sign it as being true. This process concentrates their minds and preserves
their evidence in case they are called upon later.

0 Copy all Transmissions (ship or share):
This includes calling other ships within the vicinity of the ship being investigated and

interviewing those who may have witnessed the collision.

3.1.5 Check that the Final Story Works:

Compare and analyse all data to ensure a logical, rational record of events leading to

the collision. The objective of the investigator is to ensure that a clear explanation of
how the collision occurred that is supported by the evidence and statements is
available. All the evidence must then be arranged to give a scenario of the collision.

The jurisdiction under which the casualty investigator operates should be defined for
this might not be obvious at the outset. The investigator is to be clearly instructed and

guided on how to proceed by a counsel regarding the laws to follow and to maintain

confidentiality in the preparation of the initial report. The issue might be complicated

further, not only by the various ﬂag states’ enquiries, but also those of the government

agencies of the country within whose waters the casualty took place.
Mr. Leslie R. Morris of London Offshore Consultants (1996, 34) has stated:
The Master of a ship involved in an accident should consult an

attorney before committing anything in writing. Many masters

were taught to record details of an incident in writing as soon
as possible after an event. This is good advice in general, but

the record should be maintained by the master as his notes until
his own attorney has had an opportunity to advise him.

In general, as soon as an investigation has been completed, the investigator proceeds to

prepare a report in a draft form initially of a “Speed and Angle of Blow Report”. This
is based only on a survey of damages sustained by the ship/s involved. After this initial

survey he could then proceed to do a thorough navigation assessment of both ships in
the case of collision.

3.2 Statistics:

3.2.1. Analysis of Major Claims
The UK P&I Club has published statistics since 1990 about various types of claims it
has handled:

For the purpose of analysis it was decided to review only those

claims which exceeded USDl00,000 in value. Each year the
club deals with as many as 15,000 individual claims the

majority of which are worth less than this amount. Although

claims over USDl00,000

represent only 2% in number,

nonetheless they represent more than 69% by value. During a
period of several years, a total of 123 collision claims were

analysed which represented 10% of the value of the total claim
analysed. The total value of these claims was USD79 million.

3.2.2 Status of the Ship at Time of Collision:
The table 3.1 below shows the status of the ship at the time of collision. In 82% of
cases, the ship is described as being ‘underway’. In the table, this category is divided

into two headings- underway at a suitable speed and underway at excessive speed. It
will be noted that 20% of the claims fall into the earlier category. So a relatively small

number of collisions occurred in close quarter manoeuvring such as anchoring or
berthing.

Table 3.1- Status at Time of Collision
_

Berthrng

At Anchorage
9%

Other

3%

6%

Excessive Speed
20%

Suitable Speed
32%

3.2.3 Place of Occurrence:

The table 3.2 below shows where the majority of claims took place. Collisions are
much more likely to happen in coastal waters and in areas of restricted navigation.

However open water collisions accounted for a larger proportion of the total value of
claims than those in coastal waters (30% as opposed to 16%). There is a high number

of collisions taking place at anchorage.

Table 3.2- Place of Occurrence

Other

h I-hrbour
14%

Separation Zone

Al Anchorage
7%
River ICanal
11%

coastal Waters
31%

Open Waters
22%

3.2.4 Status of ‘Other’ Ship:

The table 3.3 shows that the number of collisions involving ﬁshing vessels is high and

in 55% of cases, the other ship was underway.
Table 3.3- Status of ‘other’ Ship.

Underw ay
55%

Al Anchorage
16%

3.2.5 Type of Collision:
The table 3.4 shows clearly that the greatest number of accidents occurred in a
crossing situation.
Table 3.4- Type of Collision

One Ship Static
20%

Other
6%

overtaking
10%

Crossing
39%
End on

25%

3.2.6 Visibilityand Sea State:

Table. 3.5- VISIBILITY
Fair

5%

Good
57%

Table 3.6- SEA STATE
Moderate
19%
Rough
5%

Slight

36%

These tables 3.5 and 3.6- Visibility and Sea State, show a most interesting outcome, in

the sense that it is assumed that poor weather conditions would play a large part in
such accidents but this table shows this not to be the case. 62% of collisions were in
good or fair visibility and the sea state was described as ‘slight’ or ‘calm’ in 76% of
cases.

3.2.7. Bulk Canier casualties:

Table 3.7 shows that the rate of structural failures and ship lost at sea of bulk carriers
increased between 1989 and 1994, with the worst year being 1991 when 11 ships were

lost and 14 serious structural failures occurred.

Table 3.7- Rate of Bulk Carrier Casualties per year.
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3.2.8 Cost of casualties

The table 3.8 shows a summary of net claims paid during the ﬁnancial years 1989 to

1997 by the Assuranceforeningen Gard (mutual protection and indemnity insurance).
It is shown that total claims paid over a decade ago have doubled.
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CHAPTER 4

4. MAJOR AND SERIOUS CASUALTIES AT SEA

This chapter is focused on maritime casualties that have had major media attention and

caused the introduction of new regulations, conventions or codes over the years. An
overview of these casualties and the lessons learned from them will be considered. It is

vitally important that investigations are carried out anytime a casualty occurs so that

the why, how, where and what facts of the casualties can be deduced to prevent

reoccurrence of this sort of casualty. The obligation to cany out the investigation is
on the ﬂag state and stems in part from the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), Annex to Chapter 1, part C, Regulation 21(a) which
states:

Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of
any casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to the

provisions of the present Convention when it judges that such
an investigation may assist in detennining what changes in the
present regulations might be desirable.

The impact of human factors in casualties pre-empts the provision of IMO Resolution
A.285(VIII) which contains principles for a good bridge watch preventing
overconfrdence.
The effect of the media had been the main motivation in finding preventive methods

following a casualty. Some of the major casualties at sea that have changed the way
things had been previously are;

0 TITANIC (19l2)- SOLAS.
6 TORREYCANYON (l967)- MARPOL.

O AMOCO CADIZ

(1978)- STEERING GEAR REGULATION

COMPENSATION.
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/ OILPOL

o HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE

(19s7)- GUIDELINES ON SAFETY

MANAGEMENT. 19/10/89.

o ESTONIA (1994). THE REVISED srcw

CONVENTION.

o EXXON VALDEZ (l989)- OPA 90.

o SCANDINAVIANSTAR (1990)-ISM-CODE.

4.1. Titanic

The steam ship Titanic was a three-screw ship built by Harland and Wolff shipbuilding
yard in Belfast, Northern Ireland in 1912 for the White star Line. She was about 270
metres in length; 28 metres breadth; depth of hold 18 metres; displacement at 10.5

metres was 52,310 tons with a gross tonnage of 46,328 tons and 21,831 net register
tons.

The owners were the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited usually

known as the White Star line and registered in Britain. She canied a crew of 885 men

and women and the total number of passengers onboard was 1,316.

The ship was built throughout of steel and had a cellular double bottom with a ﬂoor at
every frame, its depth at the‘centre line being 63 inches (1.6 metres), except in way of

the reciprocating machinery where it was 78 inches (1.98 metres). For about half of
the length of the ship this double bottom extended up to the ship’s side to a height of 7
feet (2.13 metres) above the keel.

Forward and aft of the machinery space the

protection of the inner bottom extended to a lesser height above the keel. It was so

divided that there were four separate watertight compartments in the breadth of the
ship. Before and abaft the machinery space there was a watertight division at the

centre line only, except in the foremost and aftermost tanks. Above the double bottom
the ship was constructed on the usual transverse frame system, reinforced by web
frames, which extended to the highest decks. At the forward end the framing and

plating was strengthened with a view to preventing panting and damage when meeting
thin harbour ice.

There were four elliptical-shaped ﬁinnels, the three forward ones were for the exhaust
of combustion gases from the boiler fumaces, and the aft one was placed over the
turbine space and used as a ventilator. The galley ﬁinnels were led up this ﬁinnel. All

overboard discharge from the circulating pumps, ballast pumps, and bilge pumps were
below the deep load-line but above the light load line.

The investigation of the sinking of this ship was thorough but the exposure of
information to the public was inadequate. She sank in the early hours of 15 April 1912

aﬁer striking ice in or near Latitude 41° 46’ N. Longitude 50° 14’ W. in the North

Atlantic Ocean. The proximate loss of 1,490 lives on the Titanic was due to an

insufﬁcient number of life saving apparatus on board. She canied collapsible life boats

on deck that were not easy to launch. Only about seventy percent of the passengers
could have been saved even if all the lifeboats on board were launched. Unfortunately,

a lot of the passengers refused to use the makeshift liferafts supposing that it was safer
to remain on board the Titanic than go to the liferafts.

The Titanic proximate cause, that is, the highest contributable cause the inferior quality
of the hull steel.

The steel material used for making the rivets fractured in cold

conditions allowing the overlapping hull to be pushed in by the icebergs thereby

allowing the ingress of water to ﬂood the ship.
With hindsight, it is easy to see some of the failures on board the ship. There was the

lack of responding quickly-to reports from other ships of sightings of icebergs on her
route. The master should have had a better lookout posted and slowed down the
speed of the ship. Communication between management/master/crew should be direct
and to the point.

The drop of night time temperature should have indicated the

presence of ice in the vicinity which could cause brittle fracture on steel. The eﬁicient

closing of watertight doors was questionable.

The number of lifeboats were

inadequate to take all the people onboard. In an emergency the noise from the steam

blowing ships horn prevented clear understanding of instructions from the ofﬁcer in
charge on the boat deck.

This casualty helped the maritime industry to introduce some regulations to stop some
of the anomalies experienced on the Titanic. For example, rules requiring lifeboats to
have the following:

0 Sufficient side heights to prevent easy access of water and ample stability in a sea

way, when loaded with their full complement of persons and equipment.

0 The ratio of lifeboat depth to the breadth was 4/ 10 giving the boat a good
freeboard.
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O

There were no binoculars on board to allow the lookout man to see the iceberg
ﬁxrther away from the ship than the seventy-one metres on this occasion.

O

Providing the ship with a double skin carried up above the waterline.

0 The accommodation of the lifeboat and the raft should be enough to cover the

number of persons intended to be carried and not upon the tonnage of the ship.
0 All the lifeboats must be protected from damage whilst being lowered.
O

Recommended that one or more of the lifeboats should be fitted with some form of
mechanical propulsion to help rescue other ships and survivors.

0 All boats should cany lamps and pyrotechnics lights for the purposes of signalling.
O

All the lifeboats should be marked with the number of adult persons they could

cany.
0 All lifeboats should be provided with compass and provisions.

The ﬁrst meeting arranged by the government of the United Kingdom on safety of life
at sea in 1912 was because of the sinking of this ship. A lot of the recommendations
recorded still apply today.

4.2. Herald of Free Enterprise

The Herald of Free Enterprise was a fen'y boat of overall length of 132 metres and

breadth of 23 metres with gross registered tonnage of 8,000 tons. The British fen'y
boat was owned by the shipping company Townsend Thoresen, a subsidiary of P&O.
She left her mooring at Zeebrugge at 1908 hours on Friday 6 March 1987 destination

Dover. At 1928 hours she suddenly capsized portside, without time nor opportunity

to send out a ‘mayday’ distress signal over the radio, just outside the port of
Zeebrugge in calm weather, mild sea and without warning as a result of becoming
unstable due to water in her car deck.

193 people lost their lives while 348 were

saved. This instability came about due to the free surface eﬁ‘ect of water on the main

deck, because the ship had sailed from Zeebrugge with her bow doors open.

The

oversight for not detecting the opened bow doors before sailing was as a result of the
rating, who was supposed to close this bow, being asleep.

Whereas the back-up

system, that is the two deck officers, who were to confirm that these bow doors were
effectively closed had already proceeded to the standby stations without checking.

The ﬁnal check in the system to make sure that the ship was ready and safe to proceed

to sea did not occur, that of the master of the ship conﬁrming from the chief officer
that all is safe to proceed. In extending the ﬂaw on this ship, the owners’ standing

orders to masters states, "....that in the absence of any deﬁciency being reported, the
master was to assume at sailing time that the ship was ready for all respects.” The

danger here was that nobody even checked, the bow doors went unnoticed.

The

construction of the ship's superstructure prevented the master from seeing whether the
bow doors were properly closed from the wheelhouse or wings.

The best scenario to describe this casualty was that a number of factors, none of which
in themselves could be disastrous, combined with fatal results. The rudder of the ferry

was found to be on hard to starboard after the incident, it is postulated that the master

on ﬁnding that she was taking in water via the bow doors took a sharp rudder

manoeuvre to return to port. This manoeuvre caused the 1,100 tons of the unsecured
cargo to shiﬂ and slide as water gushed through the open doors. Alternatively, the

ingress of water through the open bow doors caused the feny to roll due to free
surface effect. The car decks are open spaces of about 100 metres by 20 metres. The
effect of water in this space, .which is about 3 metres above the fenies water line would

reduce the metacentric height drastically or even become negative, thereby causing
instability. At a speed of 17-20 knots the sea would have surged 3.5 metres high on

the prow of the ship and the effect of a mass of water sloshing about uncontrollably
would easily have caused instability.

The investigation of this casualty resulted in the recommendation that indicator lights
in the wheelhouse and closed circuit television be installed on passenger ferries to

conﬁrm the state of the bow doors.
The court of enquiry ﬁndings revealed some other faults: (Heathcote, 1989, 2)

That to ﬁt the berth in Zeebrugge, the ship had to be trimmed

by the head and that the pumps were of insufﬁcient capacity to
de-ballast the tanks to attain a desirable seagoing trim at the

time of departure. That the draft could not be read ﬁ'om the
dock prior to sailing. The nominal weights used for rule-of

thumb stability calculations were inaccurate.

The stability

booklet did not address certain conditions of loading and

unloading, nor did it consider stability at large angles of Him.

Also in some occasions, the passenger manifest was inaccurate

and that the ship may well be carrying passengers in excess of
the permitted number.

The management came under criticism in light of their unclear operating procedures

for the ship; the conﬂicting standing orders for the master; the conﬁision in respect of

the responsibilitiesof the senior master; the poor organisation of crewing; the tolerance
of past unsafe practices; and the lack of concern of shore management to serious ship
board problems. The entire management system was rebuked for sloppiness. And the

cost of this casualty was estimated at USD40 million. It is well known that regulations

have contributed greatly in reducing the risk of casualty at sea, but the case of Herald

of Free Enterprise has conﬁrmed that proper monitoring of equipment and personnel
including training is of greater importance.
command structure should be in place.

A clear and ﬁrm management and

Clear, concise and unambiguous standing

orders must be given, with proper channels of communication between ship and shore.

The owners or operators of the ship should attend constantly to all matters affecting
the safety of the ship and those on board.

The ﬁndings on the cause of this casualty brought about the IMO guidelines on safety
management for ships in 1989.

4.3 Torrey Canyon

The I1VlOresolution A.173(1968) was passed aﬁer the disaster of the Torrey Canyon.

The steam ship Torrey Canyon was a single screw tanker built in 1959 at Newport
News, Virginia, USA and enlarged at Sasebo, Japan, in 1965. Aﬁer the enlargement,

she was 61,263 gross tons, 48,437 net registered tons and 120,890 dwt capacity on her
winter marks.

The main dimensions were 974 feet 5 inches (297 metres) overall

length, 125 feet 5 inches (38.32 metres) beam and 68 feet 8 inches (21 metres) depth

and classed under Lloyds Register of Shipping at 100 A-1 which is the highest
classiﬁcation.

She was registered by the Republic of Liberia and owned by the Barracuda Tanker

Corporation, a corporation organised and existing under the laws of the Republic of

Liberia. This ship sailed ﬁ'om Mina Al Ahmadi in the Persian Gulf on 18 February

1967 with 119,328 tons of crude oil for Milford Haven, England via the Cape of Good
Hope. Her draft on departure was 51 feet 3 inches (15.62 metres) forward, 54 feet 3
inches (16.54 metres) aﬂ and 52 feet 9 inches (16.08 metres) arnidships. She had a

crew of 36 officers and ratings including her master on board at the time of the
casualty.

The voyage had proceeded normally until 14 March, whilst the ship was passing

between the Spanish islands of Tenen'fe and Grand Canary in the Canary islands, the

master set a new course of 18.25°, which was intended to take the ship about 5 miles

(8 kilometres) to the west of the Scilly Islands about 1,400 miles (2240 kilometres)

away. She got stranded on Seven Stones whilst proceeding at ﬁrll sea speed of about
15.75 knots and never recovered.

The following description, by the investigators, of the layout of a section of the
wheelhouse control panel could have contributed to the casualty (Malcom, 1967, 2):

The Torrey Canyon was equipped with a Speny Gyroscope
automatic steering system. The selection lever for operating

this system was located on the right hand side of the steering
stand in the wheelhouse.
positions.

This lever or switch had three

The aft position was for ‘automatic’, the central

position was 'hand' and the forward position was 'control'. The

'control' position pennitted the rudder to be operated by a
control handle located to the left of the wheel.

On this ship there was no set procedure to follow for the operation of the selector
lever by the steering stand. Sometimes the ofﬁcer on watch has the discretion to

operate or give the helmsman the order to operate it. As the ship approached the
Scilly islands there were a lot of mistakes such as that the ship could not get her

accurate position and the master took unwarranted action so as to meet the arrival
tide, othewvise the ship could be delayed for an extra ﬁve days waiting the right tide.

The master of the ship changed his plan as to which side of the Scilly isles he wanted

to pass but decided to change his plan without adequately brieﬁng his oﬁicers.
Originally he planned to pass by the west of the Scilly Islands but changed to pass

between the Scilly Islands and the Seven Stones. The master forgot to conﬁrm the
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position of the selector lever by the steering stand at the critical moment which caused
a delay tuming the ship out of danger whilst there was still time.

The master failed to follow the Sailing Directions issued by various authorities to avoid

the dangers that are imminent around these waters. The possibility of fatigue after a

long voyage could not be ruled untenable on behalf of the master.

The master

continued on automatic steering while proceeding in the vicinity of the Scilly Islands in

close proximity of ﬁshing vessels and other ships. The master failed to practise a good

bridge resource management co-ordinating all the watches and officers.

The introduction of the ISM Code in force for Tankers, Passenger Ships and Bulk
carriers will go a long way to eliminate this type of disaster, because the

responsibilities of the master and crew are properly deﬁned and documented including
shore management also. This casualty resulted in the total loss of the ship and her

cargo, resulting in the oil pollution of the entire south-westem coast of England. This
casualty also highlights the importance of establishing sea lanes or routes to be

followed by ships approaching or passing near coastal or areas where natural or other
hazards to shipping may be encountered. The STCW95 recommends the revalidation

of certiﬁcates of competency of ofﬁcers every ﬁve years to enhance retraining and
updating of masters and crew on board ships.

4.4. Amoco Cadiz

The VLCC Amoco Cadiz was a single-screw 232,182 dwt motor tanker built in Cadiz,
Spain in 1974 by Astilleros Espanoles, S.A. Owned by Amoco Transport Co. with

gross tonnes of 109,700 with length of 334.02 metres, breadth of 51.06 metres and
depth of 26.19 metres. She drifted on to the rocks on the north coast of France near
Portsall on 16 March 1978 and spilled 220,000 tons of crude oil. The ship's steering
gear system failed about 13 kilometres north of Ushant and was never regained.

She had a four-ram steering gear system with two hydraulic pumps which were able to
deliver 196 litres per minute of oil at a working pressure of 126 kg/cmz. Two main
pipes connected each of the pumps to a main oil distribution block.
could be operated from any one or both pumps.
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All four rams

The problem started when the helmsman noticed the rudder indicator being at hard to
port even though he had 10 degrees starboard helm on to hold his course.

At this

time, in the steering gear room, oil was streaming out of the distribution block under
pressure. The port side ﬂange leading ﬁ'om the hydraulic pumps to the distribution

block was broken.

The chief engineer tried isolating this section of the hydraulic

piping system so as to keep the integrity of the system but to no avail. A relief valve

pipe connection at the top of the distribution block blew out, which is not normal.

Chain blocks and slings were used without success to prevent the violent movement of

the rudder, which did not work.

The attempt to control the steering system was

stopped when the bolts on the forward guide shoe and the universal joint in the

forward arm of the tiller disintegrated and injured one of the engineers. The design of
and selection of the studs and ﬂanges connecting the main piping to the distribution
block was not adequate.

Without steering ability the ship went on the rocks. The master failed to co-ordinate

properly the assistance from the tug boat.

This casualty brought about the

introduction of the amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 1974, in chapter II-1, Regulation 29 Steering Gear 16.1. It requires all tankers

of 10,000 gross tons and above to comply:

The main steering gear shall be so arranged that in the event of
loss of steering capability due to a single failure in any part of

one of the power actuating systems of the main steering gear,
excluding the tiller, quadrant or components serving the same

purpose, or seizure of the rudder actuators, steering capability
shall be regained in not more than 45 seconds after the loss of

one power actuating system.

The IMO passed resolution A440 (1979) as a result of the disaster of the Amoco
Cadiz. The main reason why this ship could not be rescued in time by tug boats was

because the master was waiting for instruction from the owners for permission to sign
the salvage tug Lloyds open form. By the time the clearance was given she was so

much driven aground by the weather that she could not be reﬂoated before spilling her
oil cargo. The ISM Code will go a long way to remedy this anomaly by giving the
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master the authority to take action quicker and contact a responsible manager in
charge of ship safety without much delay.

4.5. Estonia

The roll-on/roll-off motor passenger ferry Estonia capsized and sank in the Baltic sea,
off Uto Island, during the night of 27/28 September 1994 with 912 lives lost on her
voyage from Tallinn to Stockholm.

She was built in 1980 by Jos. L. Meyer,

Papenburg in Gennany and owned by Estline Marine Co., Ltd., at the time it sank.

She was 21,794 gross tonnes (grt) with length of 157.02 metres, breadth was 24.21
metres and the depth was 7.62 metres.

She was previously named ‘Wasa King’

(1992), ex ‘Silja Star’ (1992) and ex ‘Viking Sally’ (1990). She capsized due to large

amounts of water entering the car deck, loss of stability and subsequent ﬂooding of the

accommodation decks. The waves of the sea created forces that caused the door
hinges to open because the bow visor locking devices failed. The ship experienced one

of her most devastating and worst wave loading conditions since she was built. There

were some design deﬁciencies that did not meet with the accepted regulations at that
time. This is a case where a ship is caught in the transition period of a new regulation

of the IMO and due to time, cost and exemptions the structural defects were not
repaired to standard.

The three main areas of concern that culminated in the casualty were: the Visor; the

Locking Devices; and the Bow Ramp.

The visor attachments were not designed

according to normal assumptions, which include load level, load distribution to the

attachments and the failure mode.

The attachments were constructed with less

strength than the calculations required. It was assumed that this discrepancy was due
to lack of sufﬁciently detailed manufacturing and installation instructions for certain

parts of the devices. The decision of the owner's representatives of the Estonia not to
renew or repair missing and damaged mbber packing on the visor had reduced the
weathertightness of the inside of the visor. (Vogel, 1997, 2)
There was severe structural damage caused by sailing at excessive speed in heavy icy

sea. Some of the consequences of the missing rubber seals were that at sea the visor
was filled up to the outside water level meaning that water not planned for had found
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its way into the ship causing corrosion of the ship as well as impacting the bow door
ramp itself. The door ramp serves as a “collision bulkhead” to the open car deck and if
threatened ends in a disaster.

Proceeding at high speed in icy conditions is an

invitation to a casualty. The pressure from owners under which masters operate to
meet scheduled sailing and arrivals could have contributed to this casualty. This is one

of the anomalies that the ISM Code would correct by making the master and owners

more accountable and with better authority for masters to act to save crew and
property. With hindsight, even in tropical heavy seas masters take precautionary steps

of slowing down a ship to reduce the effect of pounding, vibration, heaving and other

external forces because the forces generated on impact are approximately twice that of
nonnal loading. The missing rubber packing on the visor means that the pre-tension

function of the rubber packing was lost causing the visor to shake and vibrate at sea

with the eventual result of failure due to fatigue of connecting parts.
The bow visor locking devices should have been a lot stronger to be able to withstand

the rigours and safety requirements for the regular voyages between Tallinn and

Stockholm.

When the Estonia was constructed the maritime industry's general

experience of hydrodynamic-loads on large ship structures was limited, and the design

procedures for bow doors were not up-to-date.

The classiﬁcation society design

requirement for bow doors was upgraded after the_Esrom'a had been built but the new

rules did not apply to existing ships. Unfortunately the dissemination of bow visor
incidents, and analysis of information were not properly spread within the shipping

industry. Masters thus had very little knowledge of the dangers of not keeping the
bow door visors in good condition and of the load limit they can handle.

The bow ramp is a part of the upper extension of the collision bulkhead above the
bulkhead deck and as such has to be absolutely watertight.

This is a SOLAS

requirement and contrary to this mandatory requirement, the bow ramp was severely
leaking at several locations (Vogel, 1997, 31). The whole ramp was misaligned due to

a collapsed bearing of the port outer hinge. The consequence of this misalignment
according to a German group of experts investigating the sinking: (Vogel, 1997, 33)
In closed condition the ramp was pulled by two hooks
engaging mating lugs at the upper side tight against the rubber

packing, which in this area were apparently intact. Thereaﬁer
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two bolts at each side, that is four in total, moved out of the

vessel's side, one after the other, into mating pockets at the
ramp side.

In ﬁilly extended position the bolts contacted

magnetic limit switches and if all four had this contact, the

“green indicator light” on the cardeck became activated
indicating: ‘Ramp secured’.

As a consequence of the misaligmnent of the ramp the port
lower securing bolt was unable to ﬁilly extend, whilst the port

upper bolt was just touching the inside of the ramp pocket.
The investigation by divers revealed that the pocket for the

port lower bolt was fully intact and the port upper pocket was
just slightly deformed, whilst both starboard pockets were
completely torn open.

The full-width open car deck contributed to the rapid increase in the list to starboard.
The ship's trim had changed from the time she left Tallinn to when the increase in list

started to be noticed. She was down by the stern on departure and had changed to
being trimmed by the head-because of the ﬁlll visor and the water having entered the
cardeck via the damaged bow ramp and other openings. The ramp had collapsed due

to the pressure of water from the inside but prevented from falling on the visor because
of the hydraulic holding device still in place. Some of the actions of the crew on the
ship need to be addressed, for example the ofﬁcer on watch did not make adequate use

of the television monitor to see that water had started coming into the ship. The
engineer officer in the engine control room did notice this ingress of water but for

some reason did not inform the bridge. The sinking of the Estonia brought into focus
the revision and amendment of the convention on training with the arrival of STCW95.
When a severe crash noise was heard on the cardeck about midnight indicating that the
ramp had smashed open from the inside of the cardeck, the crew tried to use the

hydraulic pumps and simultaneously the ship's speed was reduced and the bow turned

into the wind/sea, that is to port. The ship's list increased to starboard due to this
action, the water in the open cardeck must have ﬂowed to the starboard side due to
centriﬁigal force.

The ship took a sudden starboard list at 0102 hours to 18°, which most probably was

caused by additional water on the cardeck coming in through the partly open bow

ramp, all of which accumulated at starboard side. In addition to water movement, the

increase in list was due to the loss of uprighting moment by the stabilisers due to the

speed reduction from about 15 to 6 knots and the shifting of cargo by about one metre.
(Vogel, 1997, 35)

The ship continued to tum to port, but more rapidly because with the increasing

starboard list the still active starboard stabiliser ﬁn took over the function of a rudder

blade and made the ship turn to port rather quickly. The effect of the starboard ﬁn

being down to counter the starboard list was more than that of the rudder blades,
although being at hard to starboard, had little or no effect due to the list compared to
the stabiliser ﬁn. The list had exceeded 30° at about 0110 hours and the main engines

stopped. When the list was in excess of 40° the auxiliary engines stopped and the
emergency generator started. The ship, stabilised at a list of between 40° to 50°, was

then already heading South East with the funnel pointing in the direction where the
wind was blowing from.

At 0131 hours she was on her side and the emergency

generator stopped. The lessons learned from the Estonia were:
0 that during a transition period of a new convention steps should be taken to limit

the parameters under which existing ships work to keep within the new regulation.
0 that the safety factors placed on materials and constructions should be maintained as

high as possible, making safety a priority rather than economy.
0 that masters should be encouraged that getting the ship safe to port is more

honourable than keeping to schedule.
0

that chief engineers should be encouraged to refuse inadequate repairs even if the
class surveyor says it is good enough, because he knows the ship better than the
surveyor.

0

it is high time that speed limit be placed on ships of various size and design
especially in heavy seas.

CHAPTER 5

5. THE H UIWANFA CTOR IN IWARIIVECASUALTIES

The IMO deﬁnes human error as a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on

the part of an individual or group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or
undesirable results.

It should not be surprising that the human factor accounts for eighty percent of

accidents because of the dominant inﬂuence of human beings on Earth. God created
man and gave him authority and the will to choose good from evil over all the earth.

Taking a broad look at the world today will show that the inﬂuence of man has always
been to challenge ‘nature’ and has continuously done more damage than good.

George Bernard Shaw, a great British playwright, said “experience has taught that man
does not learn from experience”. It is evident today that the greenhouse effect, that is

overheating of the atmosphere, is a result of the damage caused by the industrial
revolution, which is an energy based development. Of course this has reduced the

eﬂbrt required by man to do work but in the process some fundamental rules

governing the earth have been broken. The excessive discharge of carbondioxide into

the atmosphere and the depletion of the forest wood are two diametrically opposed
situations. Man is pumping so much carbondioxide into the atmosphere and at the

same time destroying the forest which is the main source of converting this gas back to

oxygen. The other source of oxygen being the plankton in the ocean is destroyed by
man's pollution of the sea.
This chapter will deal with the human factor, vis-a-vis, its effect on casualties in the

maritime environment and maritime industry. Recently there has been a lot of debate

on the growing rate of casualties in the shipping industry in spite of the advance in
technological know how. The argument to eliminate the human factor can only be

achieved when there are no human operators.

But as long as crew are carried on

board ships the best scenario is how best to complement human action with
technology.

The Department of Transport, UK record of casualties states that the human element
was found to be present in over ninety percent of collisions and groundings, and in
over seventy-ﬁve percent of contacts and ﬁres/explosions (Bryant, 1988, 1/3).

An accident is an unexpected, unintended event with an unpleasant outcome which is
neither predictable nor controllable.

The failure of a light bulb is not normally

classiﬁed as an accident even though we cannot predict the precise life, nor control it,

but to a certain extent scientiﬁcally, the failure is due to the erosion of the tungsten

element. On the other hand accidents due to the human factor are unpredictable

because the behaviour of the human being is uncertain and there are few universally
acceptable laws within the range of the human ﬁve senses to deﬁne his action. For this

reason there is the danger of categorising most causes of accidents that cannot be
readily explained on to human factors as an easy way out of the problem.

5.1 Obstacles to safety at sea

Losses at sea may be classiﬁed under four main broad areas:

0 Those pertaining to personnel- this could result in the death of personnel, partial or
total disability and loss of personal effects.

0 Those pertaining to property- the loss of property could be either partial or total
which could be actual or constructive.
0 Those pertaining to proﬁts- resulting in off—hireor other delays due to injury to
personnel.

0 Those pertaining to liability- this could be as a result of legal liabilities either in tort

(common law), statute or due to contract agreement.
Losses may be as a result of one or more of the following:

0 Acts of God;
0 Failures due to human beings;
O Unexplained accidents;

0 Unavoidable occurrences.
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Acts of God are abnonnal situations beyond human control, like cyclones, hunicanes,
tidal waves, earthquakes etc.

It is not right to say that casualties befall only incompetent crew, but also competent
ones, even in beneﬁcial surroundings, can make serious mistakes. It is well known that
anyone can and will eventually make a mistake but similar mistakes can have widely

ditferent causes and effects. A casualty is a result of accumulated small mistakes and

each little one centres on a decision. The decision is a choice taken from a range of

options and once taken may not include the other options. It is this contrast between
risk and gain, selection and exclusion, that makes effective decision making difﬁcult

(Johnson, 1995,27).
To predict the outcome of a decision even under controlled conditions is difﬁcult and
more so in crisis where the situation changes from just being under control to being

out of control. In addition being under pressure contributes to the difﬁculty to take the
right and effective decision. The judgement to make the right decision is a complex
process that only the human mind can do well which is governed by the individual’s

training, experience, and the infonnation at hand.

One of the main obstacles to-safety at sea is the diﬁiculty for the industry to draw from
past experience. This is borne out of the inability to extract all the information from

personnel involved in previous casualties because of fear of being blamed. The priority

of investigators had previously been to ﬁnd who and where to lay the blame on rather

than ﬁnding the root cause of a casualty to prevent future occurrence. In the aviation
industry the conﬁdential reporting of accidents is allowed and is working well and so is

the Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS) where the emphasis is not mainly to
ﬁnd a culprit but to prevent future reoccurrence.

The old school of thought of punishing the incompetent should be discarded if only to

encourage them to come out of the woodwork and tell all in order to prevent ﬁiture
casualties. This will allow incompetence to be widely discussed in the work place

thereby putting pressure on the incompetent through colleagues rather than by the
management and this type of pressure has been found to be a better solution to change
behaviour and standards.
It is now generally accepted that the organisational responsibility may be a fundamental

cause of the majority of accidents classed under human error.
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The United States

National Academy of Sciences has listed fourteen factors as being the most common
causes for human error in the maritime industry (Chatterjee, 1997, 23). These include:

inattention; poor operational procedures; poor physical ﬁtness, fatigue; excessive
personnel turnover; high level of calculated risk; and stress on the job. These certainly

could not be attributed to the human only but to management.

Table 5.1 Main causes of major claims

Oew error
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Source: Safety at Sea International, 1996, 28.

Table 5.2 Main types of major claims
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Source: Safety at Sea International, 1996, 28.

Table 5.1 illustrates the main causes of major maritime claims (Safety at Sea, 1996). It

Willbe seen that at least half of the claims were due to human error and in accidents

like collisions the proportion is higher.

Poor standards of maintenance and bad
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practice are partly or wholly to blame for cases of structural failure or of machinery
failure.

From table 5.2 over sixty percent of UK P&I Club major claims are from causes

related to human error. Ships are required to operate on a twenty-four hours per day
basis and so are the crews.

The effect of working all day and all night and the

disturbance of the nonnal rhythm of time of sleep in the maritime industry is a major
contributor to stress and fatigue at sea.

Some other human factors to be taken into consideration are experience, morale,

motivation, management policies, standards of certiﬁcation, conditions of service,
environment, loyalty, language, and training.

Some of the other obstacles are that people do not recall accurately what they have
witnessed before, during and aﬁer a casualty. Unlike the airline industry, where the

black-box will give a lot of information, the log-books and reports at sea are subject to
human processes. Also the scene of the casualty does not remain constant. This will

not allow a better understanding of the physical inter-relations that culminated in the
casualty.

What crew members recall ﬁ'om a casualty could be less of the external occurrence but
mainly of their perception and all the disturbing processes that affect memory. It is

known that after a trauma, people may undergo a period of not remembering, having
distorted, blurred and hazy memory.

And as stated earlier the fear that anything

divulged during interrogation could be harmﬁil to the individual, including the need to

protect ones security and to protect the community by closing ranks could prevent
witnesses from testifying correctly.

Human error, as contributing to 80 percent of the cause of casualty, will not be

complete if the effect of those who employ the seafarers and those who issue the
certiﬁcates of competency are not taken into consideration. So the blame should not
all go to the seafarers but also to these other institutions.

It is pertinent to look at the overall cause of a casualty and not just the ﬁnal inﬂuence
be it human to arrive at a better picture as to the cause of a casualty. This is because a
casualty could have been caused by series of problems that needed the ﬁnal human
touch for it to manifest.

casualty could have been caused by series of problems that needed the ﬁnal human
touch for it to manifest.

The six main causal area already identiﬁed are: external conditions; technical failure;

inadequate navigational factors; navigational error; non-compliance; and other ships.

Extemal conditions; navigational error; and non-compliance were

found to

predominate and account for 75 percent of registered causes (Quinn, 1982, 4).
It was found that for ships of 1599 grt and above, collision occurred mostly in open

sea or restricted waters and poor visibility was a controlling factor. But for small ships

of between 100 to 1599 grt, navigational error was the main factor.

Some of the human failures that have been noted to contribute to casualties are
incompetence, negligence, conﬁision, inattention, fatigue, ignorance, anxiety, panic or

shock, sickness, drunkenness, lack of communication, negative transfer of training,
calculated risk and fear.

5.2 Education and training of crew

The common use of the term ‘human error’ is misleading because the human as the
main and only cause of a casualty is not possible.

The cause usually is by the

interaction of the human and other components. The human could be classiﬁed as one

of the component failures in a whole system component that makes up the process. It
will be more feasible to say ‘human involvement’.

In practice it is hard to separate the human from the technical elements in a total

system. The difference between the terms human factor and human element is that the

element refers to the peculiar aspects of human involvement which require a lot of

interpretation in order to be understood.
The manning, education and training of officers and ratings on board ships has become

an increasingly important factor in the regulation of ships both by the international
convention and national law.
The STCW Convention (1978) amended in 1995; the SOLAS Convention as related to
crew training and skills in the various areas; the International Safety Management

Code chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention; and the US Oil Pollution Act 1990
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(OPA90) manning and management of the ship both ashore and aﬂoat, are some of the
international conventions and laws that pertain to the crew on the ship.

In order to curtail casualties the training of seafarers must be extended from the

training to carry out routine task to the acquisition of knowledge, skills and attitudes
that a person requires in a crisis situation. A psychologist, David Kolb, described the
process by which people learn, known as the Kolb’s ‘learning circle’: (Johnson, 1995,
28)
0 Experience- something happens to the learner.
0 Reﬂection- the learner thinks about what happened.
6 Conclusion- the learner works out a theory, or modiﬁes an

existing one, or determines that the original theory holds
good.
0 Planning- the learner applies the conclusion to the situation

when it next occurs.

The leaming process would not be complete if this cycle is not complete.

It is

common for this cycle to be broken at the reflection stage, that is where the affected
party usually shrug their shoulder and say ‘just one of those things’. In practical tenns
this is the stage where de-brieﬁng is better cam'ed out with the emphasis laid on
finding out the reason for the incident and not to ﬁnd out who is to be blamed.

Another component that could affect decision making before a casualty is infonnation.
How much information has the individual accumulated prior to that point and the
ability for the human mind to absorb and process infonnation is very complex.

The complex nature of how the mind processes infonnation could be explained thus
(Johnson, 1995, 30):

The brain has two basic memory types- short term and long

term memory. Figures vary for the duration of the short term
memory, but it would seem to be based upon the individual and

whether the information stored has arrived via the ears, eyes or
other senses. Unless that infonnation is used it will be lost

(hence the use of the pocket notebook).

Information is

transferred from the short term to the long term memory by
repetition. A lot of training design is based on the old maxim
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of ‘thirty percent tuition, eighty percent repetition’ to transfer

facts, data, rule of the road, from the short tenn to the long

tenn memory. The long tenn memory uses this infonnation to
build mental models.

The master and crew onboard the ships have been trained to operate these ships to the
highest possible standard but the increase of other factors like size, speed, technology,

reduction in crew size, increase of new national ﬂags and pressure to increase proﬁt
margin have all accumulated to increase casualties rate. The introduction of STCW95
and the ISM code is in the right direction, also as stated by Professor P Muirhead, the

additional and proper training of other workers (bulk cargo terminal) related to the
ship must be taken into consideration so as to eliminate the problem of the weakest
link in the chain vis-a-vis the training of tenninal operators (Bimco special bulletin,
1998, 98-99)

The IMO being a regulatory body has been in the forefront in providing international

conventions and codes agreed to by participating member countries in improving the
education and training of personnel in the maritime industry. The ISM code is in place

now to ensure that the shore staff are themselves adequately trained, informed and

equipped to take up operational responsibilities of the ships in co-operation with the
ships management structure.

This code came into force 1 July 1998 and the main

safety management objectives are: that it provides a safety documentation and safety

practice of the operational and working environment; that it establishes a safeguard
against all identiﬁed risk expected on board; and that the skills of personnel ashore and

on board the ships are continuously improved to take care of emergencies related to
safety and the environment.

The idea of Port State Control has helped to detect and control a lot of the defective
ships sailing around the world and the MOU (memorandum of understanding) among
states and regions would block the loop-hole for escape of any ship. It is easier for a

neutral body to ﬁnd fault than for the shipowner and ﬂag states. The new chapter XI
of SOLAS regulation which came into force on 1 January 1996 gives the state control

authority power to check for the competence on operational requirements of ships
officers and ratings calling at their port.

54

The International

Convention

on

Standards

of Training, Certiﬁcation

and

Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978 entered into force on 20 April 1984 to

ensure that masters, ofﬁcers and ratings on board sea going ships are competent to
safely operate these ships.

Being the ﬁrst convention of its type, with all the

compromises required before a convention could be ratiﬁed, it introduced an

internationally accepted regulation. STCW78 lacked the teeth to etfectively monitor
the training of seafarers allowing different administrations to interpret it as they wish.

The effect of STCW95 on preventing casualties is that previously the training and

education of seafarers were knowledge based whilst STCW95 lays more emphasis on
competence based training and education.

Competence being the ‘ability to apply

skills, knowledge and understanding in perfonning to the standards expected in
employment across different conditions and in meeting changing demands’.

The

STCW95 recognised the varying level of educational systems in the various parts of
the world and has tried to provide a basic standard and reference system for the ﬁiture.

For the ﬁrst time the IMO has been given the authority to enforce this convention.
Training being one of the three main factors, that is, in addition to safety equipment

and the attitude of the individual or group of individuals to prevent casualties, is very
important.

As well as mental impairment, that is, low mental ability can reduce a

persons’ level of assimilation required to cany out work as well as study.

5.3 Inﬂuence of age, experience, stress and fatigue.

When the term human factor is used it does not mean that there is a unitary human

fault that has caused the casualty but there are several constituent factors which are

each worthy of separate consideration.
Fatigue is an example of one of these factors that plays a signiﬁcant part in a casualty.

Ships are required to be operated for twenty-four hours every day and so are the ships’

crews. The effects of working around the clock and the disturbance of the nonnal
rhythm of a human being's waking times on the ships is a source of fatigue. It is well
known that crew members must be allowed at least an eight hours rest between any

two watch or working period. Notwithstanding this rest period, the fact that the crew

55

are not allowed to leave the ship, being at sea, and in an emergency the crew member

is supposed to beon-standby puts him/her on stress practically all the time.
Fatigue is a more signiﬁcant factor in maritime accident than previously thought.

According to a US-coast guard survey, fatigue was a contributory factor in thirty-three
percent of critical ship casualties and sixteen percent of personnel injury casualties,
compared to ﬁgures of just 1.2 percent and 1.3 percent in a previous study.

Some of the factors that could trigger fatigue are;

0 Hours of work
0 Short tenn or long tenn issues
6 Condition of service at work

0 Condition of work
6 Mental versus physical work load.

As a follow up to curtailing the effect of stress on seafarers, a revision of ILO
Convention No. 109 has been reached and if suﬂicient numbers of governments ratify
the new Convention No. 180, the provision will also be subject to port state control in
foreign ports : (ITF Bulletin, 11/1997, 32)

Agreement was‘ reached on restricting working time to a
maximum of 14 hours in any 24-hour period, and to 72 hours
in any seven-day period.

There must be a minimum of 10

hours rest in any 24-hour period, or 77 hours in any seven-day

period. Most importantly the standard of an eight hour day
with one day of rest per week has been stipulated.
The restricted hours of work will apply to all seagoing ships

(excluding ﬁshing vessels) irrespective of size.

Commercial

ﬁshing vessels may be included by member states.

There are three fundamental needs required by the crew to be happy at work: it must

provide some sort of beneﬁt, that is, wages, job satisfaction, and respect; it must not be
too much work, that is, sufficient rest with intervals; it must have a sense of success,
that is, to be progressive. The inability to meet any or all of the above leads to stress.

Stress is a factor that has both positive and negative effects on humans.

Every

individual has his/her own optimum level of stress and each person reacts differently to
different situations.
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Stress is a factor that has both positive and negative effects on humans.

Every

individual has his/her own optimum level of stress and each person reacts differently
to different situations.

The human being reacts to stress in three basic ways: freeze, ﬂight or fight.

A

withdrawal ﬁ'om reality, reluctance to face up to the situation and self delusion can be

symptoms of a person who freezes under stress. Panic and abstention from the scene

t/~

are the symptoms of a person who is classed under ﬂight, whilst increased muscle

performance and misdirected aggression are symptoms of a person who is classed
under fight. The human brain has seven channels of information, that is it can attend
to seven things at the same time but under stress the brain tends to shed some of this
load

Figure 5.1 shows that the performance of an individual increases as the stress

increases up to an optimum level of performance and after that as the stress continues
to increase the performance tends to fall rapidly.

Perfonnance

Stress
A
Figure 5.1 Performance against stress
Source: Safety at Sea International, 1997, 28.

Hypostress (too little stress) is due to boredom or inactivity, and has a detrimental

effect on performance. As stress increases due to work, the perfomiance increases to
the optimum level. As long as the stress factor does not increase above this level the

performance of the individual would remain at the optimum . This performance can
be sustained as long as the individual is mentally fit just as in physical ﬁtness. The

sustenance and endurance of perfonnance would depend on the exercise routine that
the brain has been put through and this would also dictate the rate of recovery from
stressful situation.

Hyperstress is much more dangerous and harmful because of the limit of the
individuals ability to absorb stress is being approached. The graph in ﬁgure 5.2 plots

the stress against time. The ability of the individual to absorb stress during the day
vary and are within his/her stress reserve for recovery.

When a highly stressful

situation develop, and the reserves are used up, unable to cope the individual

collapses. This is one of the reasons why stress levels on board ships are being treated

with dispatch because of the catastrophic scenario that could develop that will require
professional help.

Stress Reserves

Daily highs and lows

ptimum Stress l

Danger Zone...-''''..

Hyperstress
Need for professional help

Time
Figure 5.2- Stress reserve against Time.
Source: Safety at sea international, 1997, 29.

Some of the factors that can affect the ‘background’ stress for an individual are:
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0 Physical illness or poor health.

0 Poor relationships amongst people.
0 Uncertainty, could be for continued employment.
0 A previous highly stressful experience leﬁ untreated.

Some other human factors that have bearing on casualties are experience, morale,

motivation, management policies, standards of certiﬁcation, conditions of senrice,
environment, loyalty, and language. The quality of a ship's crew has a direct bearing

on the ship's overall performance which could be extended to the causal effects on
casualties. It is not necessarily true that sub-standard ships have sub-standard crews
but a sub-standard crew will almost certainly mean a sub-standard ship. That is why

the effect of language (communication) among crew should be considered.

In the

drive to reduce high labour cost on ships especially those of the traditional maritime
nations and at the same time ensuring that a ship is properly as well as economically

manned is not easy. Shipowners have resorted to using and delegating speciﬁc tasks to

independent agents. This increasing use of agents and in particular the use of crewing
agents has created an unfamiliar relationship between the crew and the owner and so

the good old loyal bond between crew and owner is lost, including the sense of identity

with the owner's interest.
The decline in the numbers of ships sailing under traditional maritime nations together

with the gradual retirement of experienced seafarers, has altered career patterns with
changes in responsibilities, career development, depth of training, and in the levels of
experience to be found among ofﬁcers and ratings.

Experience is a component that affect decision making and without it could mean the

occurrence of casualty. At that precious moment when a decision is required to avert
an incident the individuals exposure to similar situation will be useful. The maritime

industry is beginning to see the effect of the loss of experienced seafarers who trained
and worked under the old manual systems on the bridge, deck and engine room. The

cost of manpower, improved technology and reduction in crew has gradually eroded
this effect.

Though the use of ARPA, Radar, ECDIS, GPS and the unmanned

machinery spaces have reduced the amount of experience required. The industry still

depends on experience for a better interface between man and automation.
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This is

where training using the simulator is of paramount importance. This training will

impact within a short space of time decades of experience and test the persons reaction
and ability.

The old wise saying ‘there is nothing new under the sun’ puts the

occurrence of casualties under perspective that it could be avoided if the right and
adequate precautions learned from previous cases are taken.
The age of a person involved in a casualty could be taken into account if it is related to

his experience on the job. It has been found that complacency could set in because of

the monotony of the work at sea and the OOW could be mentally locked into that
routine and forget to take action in good time to avert disaster. Age could also be a
factor when an incident involves reaction time, in this case younger officers are quick

to react to situation than older officers and better risk takers.

The human body is a good indicator of the response to stress such as; (Muirhead &
Pourzanjani, 1998)

6 Physiological- sweating, heart rate.

0 Health- nausea, indigestion, ulcers.

0 Behavioural- nervous laughter, appetite.
0 Cognitive- concentration, forgetfulness.
0 Subjective- anxiety, aggression, depression, moodiness.

Sleep is a very good form of relaxation and stress reducer and so it works
the other way round, that is, insufficient sleep could trigger stress. Some

of the factors that affect the effect of sleep are;
0 Biological clock- circadian rhythms

Sleep-wake cycle

Body temperature
000

Time of day
Sleep cycles

Required quantity of sleep
Shiﬁ work
Time zone

Port/sea situation
Naps
OOOOOOO

Sleep disorder- breathing, sleep walking, insomnia.
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‘Prevention is better than cure’ is a cliché that must be fervently upholded at sea, to

stop the occurrence of casualties. As part of these preventive measure every crew
member should endeavour to maintain the following sleep hygiene;
0 Avoid drinks with caffeine

0 Avoid napping during the day

6 Comfortable room and bed
6 Avoid mental stimulation and emotional stress
9 Warm milky drink and light reading

0 No alcohol.

In a prevailing climate of shipping depression and over-tonnage, owners have resorted
to cheap crews thereby encouraging mixed crews. The UK P&I Club investigation

shows that ﬁfty-six percent of all the tonnage under its cover had mixed crew (Safety
at Sea International, 1996, 27). The danger posed by lack of communication during an

emergency could lead to disaster.

Also the tension created ﬁ'om multicultural

differences is another source of danger.

5.4 Management ethics

The temptation for high ﬁnancial gain has been a major factor for some shipowners not

to carry out some of the maintenance and repairs required for safety on board ships.

Table 5.3- Operating cost/ﬁnancial advantage
Source: IMO-FSI 5/3/1 armex, 1996, 5.

20-year-old USD per day

40,000 dWt-USD/day

(5)

(1) Ceiling = level of maximum expenditure (inﬂuenced by financial revenue earning
potential of the ship in the freight market and financial cost of owners).

(2) Good practice = average level of expenditure adopted by majority of shipowners.

(3) Common practice = average level of expenditure adopted by majority of
shipowners

(4) Standard practice = minimum level of expenditure to ensure owners compliance
with basic standards of safety.

(5) Floor = level of minimum expenditure (still keeping the ship operational)

(6) Shaded area = margin of substandard operation within which the shipowner is able
to operate ship subject to non-detection by regulatory authorities (ﬂag states and

classification societies acting on behalf of flag states, port states )
It is imperative to point out the financial gain obtained by a shipowner who decides to

operate at the floor (5) of the table 5.3 above. With respect to the safety of navigation

and prevention of pollution of the marine environment. an owner that decides
to work within the shaded area (6) where if not detected could make a substantial
saving in running cost
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Similarly for a 40,000 dwt product tanker built in 1990 working within the time charter

market, the margin of substandard operation equates to USD 650 per day or USD
237,250 per year, equating to a 15 percent saving on annual running costs.

The decision as to where to register a ship is governed by several factors including

taxation and administrative convenience, but another point that the shipowner

considers is the law of the ﬂag state and whether this will restrict the free choice of

nationality of the crew. The percentage of ships operated by its owners is about
seventy-three percent and the remainder twenty-seven percent is by professional

management company on behalf of the owners. (UK P&I Club)
It is generally known that management companies do not employ on a full time basis

crew to man their ships but subcontract the crewing of the ships to employment
agencies. And so we have crews that do not display the committed involvement

traditionally expected. Fifty-six percent of ships sailing the international route are of

mixed crew, but thirty-two percent by nationality of the ofﬁcers onboard were from

the European union states and thirty percent from Eastern European countries. In
thirty-two percent of ships, the ratings were mainly from South East Asia with twelve
percent from the Far East and seven percent from the rest of Asia. The old traditional
way where a shipping company employs youngsters in there teens and puts them

through cadet ofﬁcers training has been lost because of the need to reduce cost in a
climate of trust and overtonnage.

For better perfonnance and safety on ships, the increasing use of management tools
like policy statements is becoming mandatory for shipowners and includes the ISM

Code and the Vessel Response plans as required under United States OPA 90. The

assumption here is that better understanding of responsibilities and systems will lead to
better performance and for it to be effective it needs to be active, that is, it must be

written down and strictly followed. And every member of the crew must be aware of
these plans. There is a common anomaly in the maritime industry whereby the plans

are available in written form but for one reason or the other they are not followed

because these are not scenarios that occur on regular basis and are easily forgotten.

The beneﬁts of good communications with and the guidance of officers through an
effective management policy helps crew efficiency and morale and reduces the distance
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between operator and employee. Certainly loyalty or the lack of it has an important

impact on the perfonnance of the ships’ crew.

Management’s attitude towards maintenance is a two edged sword, if not done
adequately could result in casualty and if over emphasised could drive to bankruptcy
and so a good balance is of the essence.

Risk management and loss prevention will have to be addressed by any management
that is worth its salt.

Risk management involves four distinct phases: planning,

organising, motivating and controlling.

It is the overall view of all risks and the

optimum management of them by minimising the frequency of occurrence and/or the
severity of the consequences.

5.5 Navigation Aids
The table 5.4 below shows the level of automation and training relative to safety on
board ships and the relevant IMO resolutions that apply. It is seen that for bridge

operation the level of automation is low whilst it is high for the engine operation and

rather unfortunate the levellof automation in maintenance does not exist.

Table 5.4- Automation and safety at sea

Safely related

Degree of

Demands in

Resolutions of

processes

automation

training

IMO

Bridge Operation

low

on shore

ISM, STCW95

Engine Operation

high

on board

ISM, STCW95

Maintenance

none

skills

ISM

The development of infonnation technology on the bridge of a ship cannot guarantee
safety at sea. It is found that the low level of automation on the bridge in addition to

the increase in information technology demands a better procedure for the interaction
between human and the instruments. The high level of automation in the engine room

demands better training of crew in order to maintain safety vis. STCW95.
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The

maintenance system on the ships require an up to date safety management system as

demanded by IMO in the ISM-Code. On board the ship administration management
tools like the Reliability Centred Maintenance system is overdue for the maritime
industry.

The increasing use of automation and the growing demand for safety demands that
technology supporting human abilities on board should be exploited to the highest
level.

Risk management and the identiﬁcation of potential dangers have largely

depended on human capability in the past even on ships with integrated bridge systems.

How can navigational risk be analysed by technology to identify the chain of errors in

sufficient time to take appropriate preventive action. This question is addressed by the

introduction of MarineSoft ANRIS 2000- Automated Navigation Risk Indication
System. This is an automatic system for assessing risk in ship navigation taking into

account the interaction between good seamanship and the available navaids. It helps
the human navigator to quickly recognise danger and effectively avoid it.

Dr. Harro Kucharzewski of MarineSoft, Rostock-Gennany said: (1997, 4)
The first installation onboard the German cruise liner CS

“AIDA” has proved that ANRIS 2000 can be easily integrated
into ship navigation systems and that the system will eﬂiciently

help to promote the safety of ship, passengers and crew by
helping the human navigator quickly recognise danger and
effectively avoid it.

The system also has an integral data recording system. This

accumulates, evaluates and acts on infonnation received as

well as reporting and reconstructing casualty scenarios to
avoid any external claims relating to navigation.

achieves

most

of

the

relevant

recommendations of the ISM-Code

ANRIS

requirements

and the

and

STCW95

Convention of the IMO.
In 1983, the IMO adopted Resolution A.528(l3) that says, ‘Being of the opinion that
the practice of weather routeing has proved of beneﬁt to ship operation and safety as
well as to their crews and cargoes..., recommends Governments to advise ships entitled
to ﬂy the ﬂag of their states of the availability.of weather routeing...’ This is in light of
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the number of ships lost due to heavy weather especially bulk carriers. The availability

of meteorological satellite pictures, numerical forecasts and other technical data helps a

ship master to plan a safe voyage. Heavy weather may be attributed as the reason for a
ship lost at sea, in reality the weather may be the ﬁnal part of other factors like ship

structural integrity, type of cargo, load and stowage condition and the engine
capability as well as the age of the ship. Structural problem could also be as a result of

a combination of weather effect caused by the pounding, slamming and yawing of the
ship in bad weather. The effect of wind, heavy precipitation, fog, icebergs and even

temperature can cause disaster the use of proper scientiﬁc forecasting of weather is
imperative.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. CONCLUSIONS

Casualties are not solely caused by actions taken by humans but by the interaction

brought about by the complex relationship between humans, machine and nature. The

potential for a casualty to occur is created when human actions and other inherent
failures present within a ship interact in a manner that breaks down the defences
already set to prevent these failures. The human being is fallible and the question is

how to reduce the frequency of his/her errors and limit their consequences that result
in casualties. This is the essence of investigating and reporting on casualties to roll

back the sequence of events to enable others to learn from the mistakes.

One of the major faults in the diagnostic and preventive ability of the human race is the

reﬁisal to study and come to the understanding that a lot of the unexplained conditions
are due to a refusal to accept the authority of a great and mighty God. The human
mind has been trained to accept only what it can see and feel and whatever it cannot
perceive with the ﬁve senses does not matter or exist. The so called ‘nature’ has laws

that govern the earth and the surrounding universe and the moment man trespasses,

out of ignorance or whatever, the consequences are always catastrophic.

Every

casualty investigated has shown that a critical in-depth analysis would reveal the ﬂaw

of a love of money being the driving force that controls the decision of man. This
statement is made on the premise that maritime transport is governed by trade and
trade by the economy of the different parties involved. Safety at sea cost money and

the only way to guarantee safety is to obey the laws of God which means taking the
interest of human being as priority over maximised proﬁt.
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If the maritime industry wants to continue carrying up to ninety-seven percent of world
trade it needs to address the casualty rate. This is crippling two of the major sources
and assets of the industry, that is, personnel and the physical asset.

The non observance of [MO and other international rules and standards has eroded the
competitive advantage of a fair market place.

There are advantages gained by

unscrupulous ship owners who are in the business only for the short term ﬁnancial

gain, without proper monitoring of the human and technical management of ships’
safety. This has created a disadvantage to the shipowners who diligently maintain their
ships and obey the rules.

The fall in freight rates, ﬁnancial pressures and increased competition have led to some

shipowners cutting back on maintenance of ships releasing this fund for other sectors.
Safety costs money as shown in the following areas:

9 in maintaining the ship in a technically sound state of seaworthiness- supplying of

spares, stores, regular overhauls of navigational, cargo handling, engine room and
other machinery and equipment;
0 making sure that life-saving appliances, ﬁre-ﬁghting equipment and other safety

items are kept in a state of readiness;
0 providing adequate training of seafarers and ofﬁce staff including regular drills and

exercises;
O

in establishing and maintaining a well organised and disciplined safety management

(SMS) system, combining both ship and shore operations.

This includes regular

safety inspections, internal audits, management reviews, report and follow-up of
accidents, incidents and deﬁciencies.

The cost advantage of maintaining a ship at a high standard compared to just spending
enough only to meet with basic standards of safety can be as much as 15 percent

saving on the daily running cost. Savings are also made through Port State Control
not detecting defects until during the annual surveys especially if this defect could

interrupt the trading of the ship.
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A good education of masters and ofﬁcers was recognised as an effective method of

attracting awareness to the dangers of human error, excessive speed in restricted
visibility and space, bad habits, social and environmental consequences that culminate
in casualties.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this work the following recommendations were made:
0 Major casualty reports should be mandatory for all deep sea ships to can'y and to be
studied by the masters and ofﬁcers;
O

A greater use of simulators for the training of crew because of the ability to examine

O

Better qualiﬁed teenagers should be employed as deck and engine room cadets so

casualty scenarios without danger to ship or crew;

as to raise the standard of oﬁicers being produced in view of the technologically
improved ships plying the oceans;
O

The examinations and certiﬁcation of ofﬁcers and ratings should be structured to
meet with the provisions of at least STCW95 conventions requirements.

0 Not withstanding the requirements of STCW95, ofﬁcers should be educated up to

university degree level. This certainly will encourage the good quality students to

apply for jobs within the offshore and shore sector of the industry.
0 The explicitness of the division of work tasks on board ships should be improved.
9 Communication between the

U

"......,:.../uf"'uu:i as well as other staff must

be improved, to alleviate safety constraints, to increase information distribution and
to avoid mistakes.
6 The practical implementation of IMO conventions- SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW95,

ISM Code should be encouraged.
O

The physical and mental being of crew should be improved by allowing them to rest
adequately as per IMO convention.

O

The division of work tasks on board ship must be defined and improved because the
workload on modern ships is moving from a physical to a mental load.

O

With reduced crew on ships the physical and mental load have been quite high, and

the problem of stress and fatigue should be treated without disdain.
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The ﬂow of communication between management, master and crew must be
intensiﬁed for better infonnation distribution, avoiding mistakes and for safety.
O

Attention should be given to the amount of rest (sleep) the crew have on board in

O

The health and safety of the crew on board should not be neglected. Management

addition to comfortable accommodation so as to reduce stress and fatigue.

should act early to support and rehabilitate the crew’s physical and mental well
being.

Priority should not be placed in producing more rules and regulations but to
effectively implementing those already in place.

The sole reason for investigating a casualty should not be solely to ﬁnd who is to

blame but to be able to gather information that will prevent reoccurrence.
O

It is widely acknowledged that eighty percent of accidents are caused by human

error but this only conﬁnns that this is because the human element is the controlling

factor in the system and not just the weakest link. Investigators should do more to
ﬁnding the root cause of the accident than concluding by placing the blame on the
human element that controls the operation.
O

Manufacturers should p'r'oduce ergonomically compatible and safe equipment for

use on board ship. A better understanding of the practical needs and limitations of
the end user should be taken into account.
O

Emphasis should be placed in designing a good interface between man and machine

rather than building a totally unmanned ship. It is well known that automation
produces an efficient, safe and reliable system.
O

The need for vigilance by the officer on watch of the ship's position and the

O

There is need for good bridge organisation and a well prepared passage plan is

importance of using all means available for position ﬁxing.

imperative. Keeping a good lookout and reacting positively to situations in good
time must be emphasised.
O

The oﬁicer on watch must not be aﬁ'aid to provide essential navigation infonnation
to the master and express concern about the ship’s safety.

O

When in doubt the officer on watch should not hesitate to call the master or chief
engineer as the case may be.
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